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Introduction and summary
One of the best known facts about labor market dynamics 
in the U.S. economy is that unemployment and vacancies 
are strongly negatively correlated, an empirical relation-
ship called the “Beveridge curve.”1 In recent times, how-
ever, large deviations from the Beveridge curve have 
been observed. In particular, vacancies have increased 
quite significantly since mid-2009, but this phenomenon 
has not been accompanied by a substantial decrease in 
the unemployment rate (see figure 1). This failure of 
the Beveridge curve has surprised many economists and 
has been interpreted as evidence of mismatch, that is, of 
increased frictions in the process through which workers 
meet job opportunities (for example, Kocherlakota, 
2010). The purpose of this article is to provide a mea-
sure of mismatch in U.S. labor markets and to assess 
its importance in determining the behavior of the un-
employment rate and other labor market outcomes since 
the start of the latest recession. The framework that  
I use is a simplified version of the Mortensen and  
Pissarides (1994) model. Since my purpose is to use 
it as a tool for organizing and interpreting data, I will 
abstract from any explicit decision making and focus 
on the essential structure of the model. 
The basic structure of the Mortensen and Pissarides 
model has three main components. First, it has an aggre-
gate matching function that summarizes the process 
through which unemployed workers and employers 
with open vacancies search for each other and meet. 
It functions very much like a standard production func-
tion, with unemployed workers and vacancies entering 
as inputs of production and the number of matches 
formed appearing as output. The second element is a 
free-entry condition for the creation of vacancies. In 
particular, it is assumed that there is a fixed cost to post 
a vacancy and that employers create vacancies up to 
the point at which the expected discounted value of a 
filled job equals this fixed cost. The expected value of 
a job is given by the probability of filling the job, which 
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is determined by the aggregate matching function, and 
by the value of a job. In a full-blown version of the 
model, the value of a job is endogenously determined 
by the expected revenues that the job will generate and 
by the bargaining power of the worker. However, in 
the simplified version considered in this article, I am 
silent about the explicit process through which the value 
of a job is determined. The third main component is a 
simple accounting relationship that states that the total 
flows in and out of each labor market state must be equal. 
A standard approach in the literature is to allow only 
for two labor market states (employment and unemploy-
ment) and to assume that the model is always at its 
steady state (that is, its long-run equilibrium). However, 
I consider more flexible specifications in this article. 
I use this simple version of the Mortensen and 
Pissarides model to measure mismatch and evaluate 
its consequences during the post-2007 recession period. 
This is not the first article to do this. Two closely re-
lated papers are Barlevy (2011) and Barnichon and 
Figura (2010). Barlevy follows the standard approach 
by postulating two labor market states, assuming a con-
stant separation rate (that is, the rate at which workers 
transit from employment into unemployment), and by 
assuming that the model is always at its long-run steady 
state. On the contrary, Barnichon and Figura incorpo-
rate a third labor market state (nonparticipation) and 
allow the transition rates between the three labor market 
states to vary over time. However, similar to Barlevy, 
Barnichon and Figura assume that the model is always 
at its steady state and that only unemployed workers 
enter the matching function.2148 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Unemployment rate vs. vacancies
vacancies
Note: Vacancies and unemployment are normalized  
by total labor force.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 









0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11
2001:01–2009:05  2009:06–2011:02  
unemployment
Given the different assumptions made in the liter-
ature, I use my model to evaluate how sensitive the re-
sults are to the different specifications. I consider the 
following dimensions. First, I assess the importance of 
allowing the separation rate to vary over time instead 
of assuming it to be constant. Second, I evaluate the con-
sequences of specifying three labor market states instead 
of two. Third, I assess the consequences of assuming 
that the model is always at its steady state instead of 
allowing for transitionary dynamics. Fourth, I evaluate 
the consequences of allowing nonparticipants to enter the 
matching function instead of assuming that the matching 
function solely applies to unemployed workers. 
I find that the results are extremely sensitive to 
the alternative specifications. However, in the preferred 
scenario (which has three labor market states, variable 
transition rates, transitionary dynamics, and nonpartici-
pants entering the matching function), I obtain the fol-
lowing findings.3 First, the matching efficiency has 
been quite volatile throughout the whole sample period 
(2001:1[January]–2011:2[February]). Second, the 
matching efficiency has been drifting down since the 
start of the last recession. Third, the value of filled jobs 
plummeted between 2007:12 (the start of the latest 
recession) and 2009:6, but it has recovered quite signif-
icantly since then. Fourth, conditional on the observed 
paths for the value of a job and all transition rates, the 
drop in matching efficiency since the start of the re-
cession has had only a moderate impact on the unem-
ployment rate: The current unemployment rate would 
be 1 percentage point lower if the matching efficiency 
had stayed unchanged. Fifth, the bulk of the increase in 
the unemployment rate since the start of the recession 
is accounted for by changes in the transition rates across 
labor market states. Sixth, the matching efficiency, the 
value of a job, the transition rates, and the search in-
tensity of nonparticipants all have significant effects 
on the dynamics of nonparticipation. Since they de-
emphasize the importance of matching inefficiencies 
in explaining the large increase in the unemployment 
rate since the start of the last recession, the results in 
this paper are consistent with a greater role for policy 
in achieving improvements in labor market conditions. 
In the next section, I consider the case of two la-
bor market states. In the following section, I consider 
the case of three labor market states and a matching 
function with only unemployed workers. Then, I con-
sider the case of three labor market states but allow 
for nonparticipants to enter the matching function. 
Readers solely interested in learning about the rela-
tive contributions to unemployment dynamics should 
jump to the last section of the paper, which uses the 
preferred scenario. The first two sections report results 
using alternative but less satisfactory methodologies.
The case of two labor market states
There are two types of agents: firms and workers. 
Each firm has one job available, which can either be 
filled or vacant. The expected discounted value of 
profits generated by a filled job is equal to Jt units of 
the numeraire. Posting a vacant job requires k units 
of the numeraire. There is an infinite number of poten-
tial firms. Workers can be in either of two states: em-
ployed or unemployed. Employed workers get separated 
from their current jobs with probability λt . Unemployed 
workers and posted vacancies determine the total number 
of new matches that are formed according to the fol-
lowing matching function:
1
1 ) , M AU V t t =
− α α
t t
where Mt is the total number of new matches, Ut is the 
total number of unemployed workers, Vt is the total num-
ber of posted vacancies, At is the productivity of the 
matching function, and 0 < α < 1. 
Normalizing to one the total number of workers 
in the economy, the evolution of unemployment over 
time can be described by the following equation:149 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
2)   Ut +1 = Ut – Mt + (1 – Ut )λt  .
That is, the total number of workers that will be unem-
ployed tomorrow Ut+1 is equal to the total number of 
currently unemployed workers that do not find a match 
Ut − Mt , plus the total number of currently employed 
workers that get separated from their jobs (1 − Ut )λt. 
Since firms are profit maximizers, the following 
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That is, the cost of posting a vacancy k must be equal to 
the probability of filling a vacancy Mt /Vt times the ex-
pected discounted value of profits generated by a filled 
job Jt . If this condition was not satisfied, the total number 
of vacancies created would be either zero or infinity, 
depending on the direction of the resulting inequality. 
Observe that the productivity of the matching 
function At , the separation rate λt , and the expected 
discounted profits generated by a filled job Jt are ex-
ogenous to the model. Given the total number of 
workers unemployed at date zero U0     , the model gen-
erates an endogenous path for 
t t t t M V U
=
∞
+ { } , ,
0 1 .
Steady state
Assuming a constant matching productivity A, 
a constant separation rate λ, and constant expected 
discounted profits generated by a filled job J, a steady 
state of the model economy can be defined as an initial 
unemployment level U0 = U, such that the endogenous
path for 
t t t t M V U
=
∞
+ { } , ,
0 1  that the model generates is 
constant over time. That is, that Mt = M, Vt = V, and 
Ut = U for every t ≥ 0. A steady state (M, V,  U ) can 
be interpreted as the total matches, vacancies, and  
unemployment that the economy will converge to in 
the long run. 
From equations 1–3, we have that the conditions 
a steady state must satisfy are the following:
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Substituting equation 5 in equations 4 and 6 gives 
















Equation 7 defines a negative relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies and, for this reason, is 
called the “Beveridge” curve. Equation 8 defines a 
positive linear relationship between unemployment 
and vacancies and, since it is defined by a free-entry 
condition to the posting of vacancies, it is called the 
“job creation” curve. The Beveridge and job creation 
curves are depicted in figure 2. The intersection of 
these curves determines the steady state (U  *, V  * ). 
It is particularly important to determine what causes 
shifts in each of these two curves. It is possible to show 
that an increase in the separation rate λ shifts the 
Beveridge curve up, an increase in the expected dis-
counted profits from a filled job J does not affect the 
Beveridge curve, and an increase in the matching  
efficiency parameter A shifts the Beveridge curve down. 
In turn, the separation rate λ has no effect on the job 
creation curve, but an increase in either J or A rotates 
the job creation curve clockwise. Given these shifts in 
the Beveridge and job creation curves, we can now 
determine how changes in λ, J, and A affect the steady-
state pair (U  *, V  * ). In particular, we can conclude that 
that an increase in λ increases both vacancies V and 
unemployment U, that an increase in J increases V and 
reduces U, and that an increase in A reduces V. The ef-
fects of an increase in A on U are unclear from the figure, 













Thus, we can safely conclude that an increase in A 
reduces U. 
To the extent that the transitionary dynamics in 
response to a change in either λ, A, or J are fast, busi-
ness cycle fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies 
can be studied by performing the steady-state analysis 
described in the previous paragraph. Assuming that 
this is the case, we can make the following tentative 150 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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hypothesis. First, since there is a strong negative em-
pirical relationship between vacancies and unemploy-
ment between 2001:1 and 2007:12, fluctuations in the 
value of a filled job J, together with a relatively constant 
separation rate λ and a relatively constant matching 
productivity A, are the most likely scenario for explaining 
this period. Second, significant changes in A and/or λ 
are necessary for explaining the substantial deviations 
from the Beveridge curve observed after 2007:12,  
especially after 2009:6 (see figure 1). A key issue will be 
to determine the behavior of the matching efficiency 
parameter A during this later period. Another key issue 
will be to evaluate the contribution of changes in A, 
λ, and J to the unemployment and vacancy dynamics 
observed during this later period. Addressing these  
issues will be the focus of the next two subsections. 
Before proceeding, it will be convenient to rewrite 

























This makes explicit the assumption that the economy 
at any month t can be safely described by the steady-
state equations 7–8, an assumption that will be main-
tained throughout the rest of this section. 
Constant separation rate
Shimer (2005) has argued that the separation rate 
λ does not play an important role in generating unem-
ployment fluctuations. For this reason, I follow Barlevy 
(2011) and consider in this section that the separation 
rate λ is constant over time. Under this assumption, 
I use the model described by equations 9–10 to measure 
the time paths for the efficiency parameter At and the 
value of a job Jt . 
In what follows, I set the separation rate λ to 0.042, 
which is equal to the average employment-to-unemploy-
ment transition rate plus the average employment-to-
nonparticipation transition rate between 2001:1 and 
2007:12. From equation 9, we have, for any two months 
i and j, that
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Within the period 2001:1–2007:12 (which is a 
period with relatively constant matching productivity 
A), we can thus select the month i with the largest U/V 
ratio and the month j with the smallest U/V ratio and 
use them to get an estimate for α from equation 11.4 
These months happen to be i = 2003:6 and j = 2001:1. 
The estimated value of α turns out to be 0.4915.5
Equation 9 can also be used to measure the 
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Using the above value of α and averaging the 
values of At between 2001:1 and 2007:12 obtained 
from equation 12 gives an estimate of A = 1.06. 
Using this constant value for A, we can then use 
equation 9 to construct the vacancies predicted by the 
model economy (conditional on the observed unem-
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.
The predicted vacancies are shown by the red 
line in figure 3. We see that under a constant matching 
efficiency parameter A, the model does a good job at 
reproducing the behavior of vacancies between 2001:1 




Note: Vacancies and unemployment are normalized by  
total labor force.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Matching efficiency
(2 states, constant separation rate)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.



















fails to keep track of the data using a constant A. This 
suggests that the matching efficiency parameter A may 
have experienced substantial changes in this later period. 
To show that this could be the case, figure 4 reports 
the values for At (in logs) measured from equation 12 
for the whole sample period (the vertical line corresponds 
to 2007:12, that is, to the start of the past recession). 
We see that the matching efficiency was relatively stable 
before 2008:1. However, starting in 2008:1, the matching 
efficiency has fluctuated quite substantially. In partic-
ular, we see that after an initial increase, the matching 
efficiency has been decreasing continuously, reaching 
a cumulative drop of 17.5 percent by 2010:11. 
Normalizing the cost of posting a vacancy k to 
one and using the path for At already found, equation 
10 can be used to construct a time series for the value 













Figure 5 reports the evolution of the value of a 
job between 2001:1 and 2011:2 (in logs). We see that 
Jt dropped quite substantially during the recession: 
Between 2007:12 and 2009:8, the value of a job de-
clined by 68 percent.6
I now turn to evaluate the contributions of changes 
in At and Jt to the dynamics of unemployment and vacan-
cies since the beginning of the recession. In order to 
do this, I compute adjusted unemployment Ut
* and 
adjusted vacancies Vt
* using equations 9–10 under 
the assumption that At = A2007:12, for every month t. 
That is, I let the value of a job Jt evolve as in figure 5 
(that is, as in the data) but fix the matching productivity 
to the value that it had at the start of the recession. For 
this reason, Ut
* and Vt
* measure the unemployment 
rates and vacancies that would have been obtained 
had the matching productivity remained constant at 
its December 2007 level but the path for the value of 
a job Jt had remained the same. Observe that in a full-
blown model (in which Jt is endogenously determined), 
a change in the path for At would generally affect the 
path for Jt. As a consequence, comparing ( ,
* * U V t t ) with 
(Ut , Vt ) cannot be strictly interpreted as describing the 
total effects of variations in At ; it should be interpreted 
as describing the conditional effects of At (that is, con-
ditional on the observed path for Jt ). In a full-blown 
model, the variations in At would have to be accompanied 
by variations in other variables (for example, in the 
bargaining power of workers) in order to obtain an 
unchanged path for Jt.7
Figure 6 shows the path for Ut
* (labeled “constant 
A”) and for Ut (labeled “variable A”). We see that through 
2009:1, the productivity of the matching function did 
not play an important role in the unemployment dynamics 
observed (both paths are quite similar). However, starting 
in mid-2009, we see that the decline in matching pro-
ductivity reported in figure 4 played a significant role 
in generating a significantly larger unemployment 152 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Value of a job
(2 states, constant separation rate)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Effects on unemployment rate
(2 states, constant separation rate)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.

















Variable A                    Constant A
rate. In particular, we see that by February 2011 the un-
employment rate would have been 7.5 percent instead 
of 8.9 percent had the matching productivity remained 
constant at its beginning-of-recession level. 
Figure 7 reports the paths for Vt
*
 (labeled “con-
stant A”) and for Vt (labeled “variable A”). We also 
see that through 2009:1, changes in the productivity 
of the matching function had negligible effects on  
vacancies. However, by mid-2009 both paths start to 
diverge, and we see that by February 2011 vacancies 
would have been 1.6 percent instead of 1.9 percent 
had the matching productivity remained constant at 
its 2007:12 level. 
Variable separation rate
In this section, I allow the separation rate to vary 
over time. Figure 8 reports the separation rate between 
2001:1 and 2011:2 that is obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data (once again, the vertical line depicts the beginning 
of the last recession). We see that early on in the re-
cession the separation rate increased quite significantly, 
reaching 4.9 percent by 2009:1, but that it subsequently 
trended down toward its pre-recession level. 
Given the data on Ut and Vt and the separation 
rate λt reported in figure 8, I compute the matching 
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which is analogous to equation 12, except that λt  is 
allowed to vary over time. The resulting path for the 
matching productivity At is reported in figure 9. We see 
that contrary to figure 4, we now observe large fluctu-
ations in At previous to the start of the recession. Another 
difference is that there is a sharp increase in matching 
productivity early on in the recession that compensates 
for the 2009:1 spike in the separation rate. Also, we 
see that starting in 2009:2, the matching productivity 
trends down much more sharply than in figure 4. 
The value of filled jobs Jt is computed from 
equation 14 using the At values obtained from equa-
tion 15. The resulting path is reported in figure 10. 
We see that this path is not very different from that  
in figure 5. 
Figures 11 and 12 explore the conditional contri-
bution to unemployment and vacancies dynamics of 
the matching productivity At, the separation rate λt , and 
the value of a job Jt . In particular, I compute adjusted 
unemployment Ut
*and adjusted vacancies Vt
* using 
equations 9–10 under the assumption that At = A2007:12 
and λt = λ2007:12, for every month t. That is, I let the value 
of a job Jt evolve as in figure 10 (that is, as in the data), 
but I fix the matching productivity to the value that it 
had at the beginning of the recession A2007:12 and fix the 
separation rate to the value that it had at the beginning 
of the recession λ2007:12. In other words, Ut
* and Vt
*
measure the unemployment rates and vacancies that 
would have been obtained had the matching productivity 
and the separation rate remained constant at their  
December 2007 levels. 153 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 7
Effects on vacancies
(2 states, constant separation rate)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey and 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. 
FIguRE 8
Separation rate
Note: The separation rate is equal to the sum of the 
employment-to-unemployment and employment-to-
nonparticipation transition rates.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey.
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(2 states, variable separation rate)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Value of a job
(2 states, variable separation rate)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.


















I also compute adjusted unemployment Ut
**and 
adjusted vacancies Vt
**using equations 9–10 under 
the assumption that At = A2007:12 , for every month t 
(but I let the separation rate λt vary as in the data). 
That is, I let the value of a job Jt evolve as in figure 
10 and the separation rate λt evolve as in figure 8 but 
fix the matching productivity to the value that it had 
at the beginning of the recession A2007:12 . In other 
words, Ut t
** ** and V measure the unemployment rates 
and vacancies that would have been obtained had  
the matching productivity remained constant at its 
December 2007 level. 
In figure 11, Ut
*is labeled “constant A, constant 
λ,” Ut
**is labeled “constant A, variable λ,” and Ut  154 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Effects on unemployment rate
(2 states, variable separation rate)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FIguRE 12
Effects on vacancies
(2 states, variable separation rate)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
Constant A, variable λs
is labeled “variable A, variable λ.” We see that Ut
* 
increases in the early part of the period and decreases 
during the second part, mirroring the evolution of the 
value of a job Jt described in figure 10. In turn, Ut
** 
increases much more than Ut
* early on in the recession 
because of the early increase in the separation rate λt 
depicted in figure 8, but as the separation rate reverts 
toward its beginning-of-recession level, Ut
**starts to 
behave very much like Ut
*. Finally, since the difference 
between Ut
**and Ut is solely due to changes in the 
matching productivity, we see that the large increase 
in matching productivity early on in the recession  
(reported in figure 9) played an important role in keep-
ing unemployment relatively low. However, the large 
drop in matching productivity since early 2009 signif-
icantly contributed to maintaining an unemployment 
rate of more than 9 percent. 
In turn, figure 12 shows that the matching produc-
tivity doesn’t play a crucial role in vacancy dynamics. 
However, the large increase in the separation rate  
in the early part of the recession played a noticeable  
role in keeping vacancies relatively high early on  
in the recession. 
The case of three labor market states
The model used in the previous section had two 
labor market states: employment and unemployment. 
In this section, I allow workers to be in a third labor 
market state: nonparticipation (that is, out of the labor 
force). A main reason for doing this is that in the CPS 
data between 2001:1 and 2007:12, the total number of 
people transitioning from nonparticipation to employ-
ment is almost twice as large as the total number of 
people transitioning from unemployment to employment 
(see figure 13), although the differences have become 
much smaller since the start of the past recession. By 
considering only two market states, the analysis in the 
previous section completely missed these transitions. 
Another reason for introducing three labor market states 
into the model is that with two labor market states, it 
is not clear what separation rates to consider: separations 
into unemployment or separations into both unemploy-
ment and nonparticipation? Explicitly introducing three 
labor markets states avoids this type of issue. More gen-
erally, introducing three labor market states allows me 
to address worker flows data in a more satisfactory way. 
In this section, I follow Barnichon and Figura 
(2010) and assume that the matching function solely 
describes transitions from unemployment into employ-
ment. In particular, I assume that the matching function 
is given by 
16)  M AU V t t t t =
− α α 1 ,
where Mt are the total flows from unemployment into 
employment, Ut is unemployment, Vt are vacancies, 




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population 
Survey. 










The transition rate from employment to unemploy-
ment λt
EU, the transition rate from employment to non-
participation λt
EN, the transition rate from unemployment 
to nonparticipation λt
UN, the transition rate from nonpar-
ticipation to unemployment λt
NU, and the transition rate 
from nonparticipation to employment λt
NE are assumed 
to be exogenous to the model. 
The evolution of workers across labor market 
states is then given by the following equations:
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Equation 17 states that next-period employment 
is equal to current employment, plus all transitions 
into employment (either from unemployment or non-
participation), minus total separations (either to un-
employment or nonparticipation). Equation 18 states 
that next-period unemployment is equal to current 
unemployment, plus all transitions into unemployment 
(either from employment or nonparticipation), minus 
all transitions out of unemployment (either to employ-
ment or nonparticipation). Equation 19 states that 
next-period nonparticipation is equal to current non-
participation, plus all transitions into nonparticipation 
(either from employment or unemployment), minus 
all transitions out of nonparticipation (either to employ-
ment or unemployment). 
In what follows, total population will be normal-
ized to one, that is,
20)  Et + Ut + Nt = 1,
for every period t. 
Similar to the previous section, the following 












− α α λ
1
( )
Observe that from the point of view of a firm,  
the probability of filling a vacancy is equal to 
( ) , M N V t t
NE
t t + / λ  because matches can be formed 
with workers either coming from unemployment  
or from nonparticipation. 
Given the total number of workers unemployed  
at date zero U0 and the total number of workers that 
are nonparticipants at date zero N0 , the model generates
an endogenous path for 
t t t t t M V U N
=
∞
+ + , , ,
0 1 1 . { }  
Steady state
Assuming a constant matching productivity A, 
a constant value of a job J, and constant transition 
rates λ, a steady state of the model economy can be 
defined as an initial unemployment level U0 = U and 
an initial nonparticipation level N0 , such that the en-
dogenous path for 
t t t t t M V U N
=
∞
+ + , , ,
0 1 1 { }  that the model 
generates is constant over time. 
From equations 17–19, we have that the condi-
tions that a steady state (U, N, V  ) must satisfy are the 
following:
22)  λ
α α EU EN NE U N AU V N − ( )= ,
− 1
1 ( ) + λ λ − +
23)  λ λ λ λ λ









− α α λ
1 ( )
Similar to the previous section, it will be conve-
nient to rewrite these equations as: 






t t t t t t
NE
t U N AU V N + − − ( )
− 1
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Transition rates (λs)
Note: All transition rates are reported in logs and 
normalized to zero at the start of the last recession.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey.
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t t t t
NE
t = + .
− α α λ
1
This makes explicit the assumption that the econ-
omy at any month t can be safely described by the 
steady-state equations 22–24, an assumption that will 
be maintained throughout the following two subsections. 
Constant transition rates





EN , , λ λ  
and λt
NU, λt
NE,  in logs, normalized by their average value 
for the period 2001:1–2007:12. We see that these 
transition rates were relatively stable prior to 2007:12. 
However, we see that with the onset of the recession, 
there was a significant drop in the transition rate from 
nonparticipation to employment λt
NE, a drop in the 
transition rate from unemployment to nonparticipation 
λt
UN, a large increase in the transition rate from nonpar-
ticipation to unemployment λt
NU, and a large increase 
in the transition rate from employment to unemploy-
ment λt
EU. In turn, the transition rate from employment 
to nonparticipation was not significantly affected. 
Based on figure 14, and similar to the previous 






EN λ , , λ λ   and λt
NU λt
NE,  are constant over the 
period 2001:1–2007:12. Taking simple averages  
over this period gives the following values:
28)   λUN = 0.2258,
29)   λEU = 0.0132,
30)   λEN = 0.0281,
31)   λNE = 0.0505,
32)   λNU = 0.0253.
Substituting equation 26 in equation 25 under  
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      − +       + − −
  + +            
    − +     −   + +        
.
Assuming that A is constant over the period 
2001:1–2007:12, we can then use two months i and 
j within this period to get an estimate of α as follows:
34) 































           
           
           
 
 
− =  
  −    
  +  
 
         − +        − −        + + ×            
 
    − +     −    + +       






Note: Vacancies and unemployment are normalized  
by total civilian noninstitutional population (16 years  
and older).
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
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                                   
           
           
     
 
      − +           + − −        + +           −  
      − +     −     + +        
+ ( ) ln }. i U
     −
Picking i = 2003:6 and j = 2001:1, which are 
the months with the largest and smallest V/U ratio, 
respectively, gives an estimate of α = 0.16.8
In turn, equation 33 can be used to measure the 
matching efficiency At at month t. Using the above 
value of α and averaging the values of At between 
2001:1 and 2007:12 obtained from equation 33 gives 
an estimate of A = 0.4533.
Using this constant value for A, I can then use 
equation 33 to construct the vacancies predicted by 
the model economy (conditional on observed unem-
































−            
           
           
     =      
    +                  − +          − −          + + ×                  − +    −     + +        
.
          
Figure 15 reports unemployment as a fraction of 
total population and vacancies as a fraction of total 
population between 2001:1 and 2011:2 (black dots), 
as well as the vacancies predicted by equation 35. We 
see that the steady state of the model with three labor 
market states, constant transition rates, and a constant 
A provides a good fit to the data through 2007:12. How-
ever, since the start of the latest recession there have 
been large deviations from the stable Beveridge curve 
predicted by the model. This indicates that the matching 
efficiency parameter At must have experienced signif-
icant changes since then. Figure 16 shows that this has 
been the case. It reports the matching efficiency levels 
obtained by equation 33 between 2001:1 and 2011:2. 
We see that before 2007:12, the matching efficiency 
had been fairly stable, but it plummeted with the onset 
FIguRE 16
Matching efficiency
(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Value of a job
(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FIguRE 18
Nonparticipation
(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Note: Nonparticipation is normalized by total civilian 
noninstitutional population (16 years and older).
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
















of the recession. Observe that the magnitude of the 
fall is much larger than in figure 4 (p. 151). 
Substituting equation 26 in equation 27 we get that
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           
  +          − + =          + +       
 
Figure 17 reports the path for Jt thus measured. We 
see that it is very similar to that in figure 5 (p. 152), indi-
cating that having three labor market states does not sig-
nificantly affect the measurement of the value of a job. 
Before decomposing the effects of the matching 
efficiency parameter At and the value of a job Jt , I would 
like to point out that the results that follow should be 
taken with a grain of salt. While I selected the paths for 
At and Jt to reproduce the observed path for Ut and Vt 
(given the restrictions imposed by equations 33 and 36), 
I made no attempt to reproduce the path for nonpartici-
pation Nt, which according to the model is given by
37)  Nt NE NU EN =
λ λ λ





1 λ −   λ   +
  +  + (     )
Figure 18 reports the path for nonparticipation in 
U.S. data and the path for Nt given by equation 37. 
We see that the model does a reasonable job at repro-
ducing the path for Nt before 2007:12, but that it 
largely overpredicts nonparticipation after that. This 
suggests that either the assumption of constant transi-
tion rates or the assumption that the economy is al-
ways at the steady state of the model fails. I return to 
this issue in the next section. 
Similar to the previous section, I compute adjusted 
unemployment Ut
*,  adjusted nonparticipation  Nt
*, and
adjusted vacancies Vt
* from equations 25–27 under the 
assumption that At = A2007:12, for every month t. That is,
I let the value of a job Jt evolve as in figure 17 (that is, 
as in the data) but fix the matching productivity to the 
value that it had at the start of the recession. In other 
words, U N V t t t
* * * , , and measure the unemployment, non-
participation, and vacancies that would have been ob-
tained had the matching productivity remained constant 
at its December 2007 level but the value of a job had 
evolved as observed. 
The version of the model with constant transition 
rates delivers the following results.9 Similar to figure 6 
(p. 152), figure 19 indicates that starting in mid-2009, 
the decline in matching productivity reported in fig-
ure 16 played an important role in generating a large 
unemployment rate. This version of the model also 
indicates that by February 2011, the unemployment 
rate would have been 6.4 percent instead of 8.9 per-
cent had matching productivity remained constant at 
its beginning-of-recession level. Figure 20 shows that 159 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FiguRe 19
Effects on unemployment rate
(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FiguRe 20
Effects on nonparticipation
(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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Variable A                    Constant A
the effects of matching productivity on nonparticipation 
are very similar to those on unemployment. Finally, simi-
lar to figure 7 (p. 153), figure 21 shows that the effects 
of matching efficiency on vacancies are negligible. 
Variable transition rates
In this section, instead of assuming that transition 
rates are constant, I allow them to fluctuate as in  
figure 14. Given data on Ut and all transition rates, 
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           
           
           
=
    +                − +          − −          + +          ×      − +    −     + +           
  ,
            
an expression obtained from substituting equation 26 
in equation 25. Figure 22 reports the path for At thus 
obtained. We observe huge differences from figure 16. 
Instead of relatively stable behavior before 2007:12 
followed by a large drop, we observe significant vola-
tility throughout the sample period and a large increase 
after 2007:12. These differences indicate that the  
predictions of the model rely critically on whether 
transition rates are assumed to be constant or not. 
The value of a job Jt is measured as 
39)  ( )
1




t t t t NE
t t t t t t NE NU EN
t t t
U U
J kV AU V
−
−
           
    − +      = +      + +        
and reported in figure 23. We see that the qualitative 
behavior is similar to figure 17; however, the drop in 
Jt after the start of the past recession is now some-
what larger. 
Before turning to the decomposition of the different 
effects, I revisit the issue of how well the model is able 
to reproduce the path for nonparticipation, a path that 
has not been targeted in the calibration. Figure 24 re-
ports the path for nonparticipation in U.S. data and the 
path for Nt from equation 26. We see that contrary to 
figure 18, the model now does a reasonable job at re-
producing the path for Nt throughout the sample period. 
In principle, this should be a reason for having more 
confidence in the results obtained in this section. 
In order to decompose the different effects, I com-
pute adjusted unemployment Ut
*, adjusted nonparticipa-
tion Nt
*, and adjusted vacancies Vt
* from equations 25–
27 under the assumption that At=A2007:12 , λ λ t
UN UN = : 200712,
 λ λ t
EU EU = : 200712, λ λ t
EN EN = : 200712, λ λ t
NE NE = : 200712, and 
λ λ t
NU NU = : 200712, for every month t. That is, I let the 160 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Value of a job
(3 states, steady state, variable transition rates)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FIguRE 24
Nonparticipation
(steady state, variable transition rates)
Note: Nonparticipation is normalized by total civilian 
noninstitutional population (16 years and older). 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.


















(3 states, steady state, constant transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.









Variable A                    Constant A
FIguRE 22
Matching efficiency
(3 states, steady state, variable transition rates)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.









value of a job Jt evolve as in figure 23 (that is, as in the 
data) but fix the matching productivity and the transi-
tion rates to the values that they had at the beginning  
of the recession. In other words,  t V
∗ ∗ ∗ , U N and t , t
measure the unemployment, nonparticipation, and  
vacancies that would have been obtained had the 
matching productivity and transition rates remained 
constant at their December 2007 levels but Jt had 
evolved as it did. 161 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 25
Effects on unemployment rate
(3 states, steady state, variable transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.








Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
Constant A, variable λs
FIguRE 26
Effects on vacancies
(3 states, steady state, variable transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.









Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
Constant A, variable λs
Also, I compute adjusted unemployment Ut
**, 
adjusted nonparticipation  Nt
**, and adjusted vacancies 
Vt
** from equations 25–27 under the assumption that 
At = A2007:12 , for every month t (but letting all λt     s take 
their actual values). That is, I let the value of a job Jt 
evolve as in figure 23 and the transition rates evolve as 
in figure 14 (p. 156), but I fix the matching productivity 
to the value that it had at the beginning of the recession 
A2007:12. In other words, U N V t t t
** ** ** , , and   measure the 
unemployment, nonparticipation, and vacancies that 
would have been obtained had the matching productiv-
ity remained constant at its December 2007 level but 
all transition rates and Jt had evolved as they did. 
Figure 25 shows U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ( ) (“constant A, 
constant λ”), U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ( ) (“constant A, variable 
λ”), and Ut / (Et + Ut ) (“variable A, variable λ”). We 
see that despite the large drop in the value of a job Jt 
described in figure 23, U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ( )increased only 
moderately. In turn, U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ + ( ) increases by a 
huge amount, indicating that the large increases in the 
λt
EU and λt
NU observed after 2007:12 in figure 14 had 
a large negative impact in the labor market. Actually, 
the unemployment rate turned to increase only as de-
scribed by Ut / (Et + Ut ) because of the large increase 
in matching efficiency reported by figure 12 (p. 154). 
Figure 26 shows that the increase in matching 
productivity At 
and the changes in transition rates played 
a noticeable role in keeping vacancies relatively high. 
In turn, figure 27 shows that the increase in matching 
productivity At played a crucial role in keeping nonpar-
ticipation (N) relatively low, since the changes in tran-
sition rates would have increased it quite substantially. 
Transitionary dynamics
The previous section showed that introducing vari-
able transition rates affects the results quite significantly 
and that it allows one to keep track of the behavior of 
nonparticipation much more closely. However, the analy-
sis of the previous section suffered two drawbacks. First, 
while the calibration of the matching elasticity parameter 
α assumed constant matching efficiency and constant 
separation rates prior to 2007:12, we see from figures 14 
(p. 156) and 22 that this is not quite the case. Second, the 
analysis assumed that the steady state of the model could 
be used to describe monthly data, while the large fluctua-
tions in transition rates observed in figure 14 (p. 156) 
suggest that this may not be a good approximation. For 
these reasons, in this section I take a more direct approach 
to the calibration of the matching elasticity parameter 
α and perform the analysis without imposing that the 
model is always at its steady state. This allows me to 
evaluate to what extent this affects the results. 
Observe from equation 16 that 
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Effects on nonparticipation
(3 states, steady state, variable transition rates)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 




Note: M/V is total matches per vacancy; U/V is the 
unemployment–vacancy ratio.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
U / V








Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs









0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
In what follows, I identify Mt with the total num-
ber of workers that transition from unemployment to 
employment between months t and t + 1, as reported 










t ( ) for 
the whole sample period. We see a strong linear relation, 
suggesting that equation 40 provides a good description 
of the data with a relatively constant At. Fitting equa-
tion 40 using OLS (ordinary least squares) over the 
period 2001:1–2007:12 gives an estimate of α = 0.69. 
Given this estimated value of α, the path for the 
matching efficiency parameter At implied by equation 40 
is reported in figure 29. We see that this path is com-
pletely different from that in figure 22. The matching 
productivity is much less variable and contrary to  
figure 22, displays a large drop after the start of the last 
recession, reaching by the end of the sample period a 
value 12 percent lower than in 2007:12. There is no doubt 
that measuring At directly from the matching function 
in equation 16 gives a very different picture from mea-
suring it from the steady states of the model economy. 
Figure 30 reports the value of a job Jt obtained 
from equation 27 using the matching efficiencies At 
obtained from equation 40 and reported in figure 29. 
The figure is very similar to figure 23, again indicating 
that the path for the value of a job is robust to the dif-
ferent ways of measuring it. 
I now turn to evaluating the relative contributions 
of the value of filled jobs Jt , the matching efficiency 
parameter At, and the transition rates  t
EU
t
EN , λ λ , , t
UN λ
t
NU λ , and λt
NE
 
to unemployment dynamics since the be-
ginning of the recession. For this purpose, I proceed 
as before and find a sequence  E U N t t t




satisfies equations 17, 18, 19, and 21 under the assump-
tion that At = A2007:12, λt
UN UN = : λ200712, λt
EU EU = : λ200712, 
λ λ t
EN EN = : 200712,  λ λ t
NE NE = : 200712, and λ λ t
NU NU = : 200712,  
for every month t. That is, I let the value of a job Jt 
evolve as in figure 30 but fix the matching productivity 
and all transition rates to the values that they had in 
2007:12 (that is, at the beginning of the recession). 
Similarly, as before, E U N V t t t t
* * * * , , , , and
 
describe the 
employment, unemployment, nonparticipation, and 
vacancies levels that would have obtained if the value 
of a job had been the only variable changing over time. 
Also, I compute the  E U N V t t t t
** ** ** ** , , , and  that 
satisfy equations 17, 18, 19, and 21 under the assump-
tion that At = A2007:12, for every month t. That is, E U t t
** ** , ,
 
N V t t
** ** , and describe the employment, unemployment, 
nonparticipation, and vacancies levels that would have 
been obtained if the matching productivity parameter 
had remained constant at its December 2007 level, 
while all other variables (that is, Jt and all the λ values) 
had changed the way they did. 
Figure 31 reports the paths for U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ( )  
(“constant A, constant λ”), U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ( ) (“constant 
A, variable λ”), and U E U t t t / + ( ) (“variable A, 
variable λ”). From the U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ( )  path, we see 163 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 29
Matching efficiency
(3 states, transitionary dynamics)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FIguRE 30
Value of a job
(3 states, transitionary dynamics)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start of the 
past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.


















that changes in the value of a job Jt  played a very minor 
role in unemployment dynamics: The red line is roughly 
flat. From comparing the path for U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ( ) 
with the path for U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ( ),  I conclude that 
changes in the transition rates λ played a crucial role 
in unemployment dynamics: The gray line is widely 
different from the red line. In fact, we see that changes 
in the transition rates λ accounted for most of the un-
employment dynamics observed since the recession: 
The black line is very close to the gray line, indicating 
that the matching productivity played a minor role in 
the observed unemployment rate dynamics. 
In turn, figure 32 reports the path for Nt
* (“con-
stant A, constant λ”),  Nt
** (“constant A, variable λ”) 
and Nt (“variable A, variable λ”). From the Nt
* path, 
we see that far from accounting for the observed in-
crease in nonparticipation, changes in the value of a 
job Jt would have accounted for a decrease in nonpar-
ticipation. The bulk of the increase in nonparticipation 
is accounted for by changes in transition rates, since 
changes in the matching productivity played a relatively 
minor role: The gray line is very close to the black line). 
Finally, figure 33 shows that none of the changes 
in the matching efficiency parameter At or in the tran-
sition probabilities were important determinants of 
vacancies dynamics: The path for vacancies was mainly 
determined by Jt . 
Nonparticipants compete for vacancies
This section describes and uses the most satisfac-
tory specification of the model. Thus, it provides the 
main results of the paper. Observe that the model used 
in the previous section had three labor market states but 
only unemployed workers were inputs to the matching 
function: Nonparticipants made transitions to employ-
ment but without going through the matching function. 
I view this feature as a weakness of the previous speci-
fication of the model. The workers transitioning from 
nonparticipation to employment must be competing 
for the same vacancies as the workers transitioning from 
unemployment to employment and should therefore en-
ter the matching function in a similar way. This sec-
tion addresses this issue by modifying the matching 
function of the previous section accordingly. Introduc-
ing a more satisfactory specification for the matching 
function allows me to obtain better measurements of 
the matching efficiency. 
The matching function is now described as follows:
41)  M A U N V t t t t t t = + , ( )
− α α ψ
1
where Mt  is the total number of matches, Ut  is unem-
ployment, Nt is nonparticipation, Vt is vacancies, At 
is the matching efficiency, 0 ≤ ψt ≤ 1, and 0 < α < 1. 
Observe that ψt can be interpreted as the fraction of 
the total number of workers who report they are non-
participants but search for jobs anyway. Alternatively, 164 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Effects on unemployment
(3 states, transitionary dynamics)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.










Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
Constant A, variable λs
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Effects on nonparticipation
(3 states, transitionary dynamics)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.







Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
Constant A, variable λs
ψt can be interpreted as the search intensity of non-
participant workers. 
The transition rate from unemployment into em-
ployment λt
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t t t + ( ) ψ of the total matches Mt is 
formed with unemployed workers. Similarly, the  
transition rate from nonparticipation into employment 
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U N + ( )of the total matches Mt  is 
formed with nonparticipant workers. 
The transition rate from employment to unemploy-
ment λt








and the transition rate from 
nonparticipation to unemployment λt
NU are assumed 
to be exogenous to the model. 
The evolution of workers across labor market 
states is then given by the following equations:
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Equation 44 states that next-period employment 
is equal to current employment, plus all new matches, 
minus total separations (either to unemployment or non-
participation). Equation 45 states that next-period unem-
ployment is equal to current unemployment, plus all 
transitions into unemployment (either from employment 
or nonparticipation), minus all transitions out of un-
employment (either to employment or nonparticipation). 
Equation 46 states that next-period nonparticipation is 
equal to current nonparticipation, plus all transitions 
into nonparticipation (either from employment or  
unemployment), minus all transitions out of nonpar-
ticipation (either to employment or unemployment). 165 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago







t = , ( )
since from the point of view of a firm, the probability 
of filling a vacancy is now equal to Mt / Vt  . 
Observe that using equations 41, 42, and 43, we 
can rewrite equations 44–47 as follows:
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− α α ψ
1
Given the total number of workers unemployed 
at date zero U0 and the total number of workers that 
are nonparticipants at date zero N0, the model gener-
ates an endogenous path for { } 1 1 0 t t t t t M V U N
∞
+ + = , , , .
.
Results
From equations 42 and 43, we have that the search 









Figure 34 shows that the fraction of nonparticipants 
that search has increased quite substantially since the 
start of the latest recession. 
From equation 41, we have that
53)  ( ) ln ln ln






    +ψ
= +α .    
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In what follows, I identify Mt with the total num-
ber of workers that transition from unemployment 
into employment between months t and t + 1, plus the 
total number of workers that transition from nonpar-
ticipation into employment between those same months, 
FiguRe 34
Search intensity of nonparticipants
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.










(3 states, transitionary dynamics)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.









Variable A, variable λs
Constant A, constant λs
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Matching function
M /  V
Note: M/V is total matches per vacancy; (u+ψ*N)/V is total 
searchers per vacancy.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
FIguRE 36
Matching efficiency (transitionary dynamics, 
N in matching function)
Note: The log of At is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.
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ψ  for the whole sample period. We see a 
strong linear relation, suggesting that equation 53 pro-
vides a good description of the data with a relatively 
constant At. Fitting equation 53 using OLS between 
2001:1 and 2007:12 gives an estimate of α = 0.62. 
Given this estimated value of α, the path for the 
matching efficiency parameter At implied by equation 
53 is reported in figure 36. We see that the path is not 
very different from figure 29 (p. 163). In turn, the 








is reported in figure 37. We also see that its path is 
not very different from figure 30 (p. 163). 
In order to decompose the effects of the different 
variables on labor market dynamics, I find the E U t t
* * , ,
N V t t
* * , and  that satisfy equations 48–51 under the as-
sumption that At = A2007:12, ψt = ψ2007:12, λ λ t
UN UN = : 2007 12, 
λ λ t
EU EU = : 2007 12, λ λ t
EN EN = : 2007 12,
 
and λ λ t
NU NU = : 2007 12, for 
every month t. That is, E U N V t t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ , , ,and  describe 
the employment, unemployment, nonparticipation, 
and vacancies levels that would have been obtained if 
Jt had changed the way it did but all other variables 
had remained constant at their December 2007 levels. 
Also, I compute the E U N V t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ , , , and t t that 
satisfy equations 48–51 under the assumption that  
At = A2007:12 and ψt = ψ2007:12 , for every month t. That is,
 E U t t
∗∗ ∗∗ , , N V t t
∗∗ ∗∗ , and describe the employment, un-
employment, nonparticipation, and vacancies levels 
that would have been obtained if Jt and all λ values had 
changed the way they did but At and ψt had remained 
constant at their December 2007 levels. 
Similarly, I compute the E U N V t t t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ , , and ,  
that satisfy equations 48–51 under the assumption 
that ψt = ψ2007:12, for every month t. That is, E U t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ , ,
 N V t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ , and describe the employment, unemploy-
ment, nonparticipation, and vacancies levels that 
would have been obtained if At , Jt , and all λ values 
had changed the way they did but ψt had remained 
constant at its December 2007 level. 
Figure 38 reports the paths for U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ) (  
(“constant A, λ, ψ”), U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ) (  (“constant A, 
ψ”), U E U t t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ / + ) (  (“constant ψ”), and Ut / (Et + 
Ut ) (“everything variable”). From the U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ) (  
path, we see that changes in the value of a job Jt played 
a very minor role in unemployment dynamics: From 
an initial unemployment rate of 4.9 percent, changes 
in Jt are only able to generate a peak unemployment 
rate of 6.4 percent. From comparing the path for 
U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ) (  with the path for U E U t t t
∗ ∗ ∗ / + ) ( , 
we see that changes in the transition rates λ played 
a crucial role in generating the large and persistent  167 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Value of a job (transitionary dynamics, 
N in matching function)
Note: The log of Jt is normalized to zero at the start 
of the past recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.










(transitionary dynamics, N in matching function)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. 










Constant A, λs, ψ
Constant A, ψ
Constant ψ
increase in the unemployment rate. In fact, the path 
for U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ) (  is very similar to U E U t t t / + ( ). 
Comparing U E U t t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ / + ) (  with U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ) ( , 
we see that the large drop in matching efficiency shown 
in figure 36 had a nontrivial role in the increase in the 
unemployment rate: The largest difference between 
U E U t t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ / + ) (  and U E U t t t
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ / + ) (  is 1.5 per-
cent. Comparing U E U t t t
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ / + ) (  with Ut / (Et + Ut), 
we see that the increase in the search intensity of non-
participants shown in figure 34 roughly offsets the  
effects of the fall in matching efficiency. 
Figure 39 reports the paths for Nt
∗ (“constant A, 
λ, ψ”), Nt
∗∗ (“constant A, ψ”), Nt
∗∗∗ (“constant ψ”) and 
Nt (“everything variable”). We see that the value of a 
job had a significant effect on nonparticipation: The 
gray line first declines and then increases quite rapidly. 
The changes in transition rates first increased nonpar-
ticipation but then lowered it: The red line is initially 
above the gray line, but it crosses it in mid-2009. The 
drop in matching efficiency of figure 36 has the effect 
of increasing nonparticipation: The light red line is 
significantly higher than the red line. However, the large 
increase in the search intensity of nonparticipants 
shown in figure 34 had a large effect on reducing 
nonparticipation: The black line is much lower than 
the light red line. 
Lastly, figure 40 shows that the only important 
determinant of vacancy dynamics was the value of  
a job Jt (all other lines are quite similar to the gray). 
Conclusion
This article has explored different approaches to 
measuring matching efficiency and assessing its impli-
cations for labor market dynamics since the start of 
the past recession. In particular, I evaluated the impor-
tance of allowing for a third labor market state, allow-
ing for variable transition rates, considering explicit 
transitionary dynamics, and allowing nonparticipants 
to enter the matching function. I find that the results 
are quite sensitive to the different specifications. 
In the preferred scenario (that is, the case with 
three labor market states, variable transition rates, 
nonparticipants entering the matching function, and 
explicit transitionary dynamics), I obtained the following 
findings. First, the matching efficiency parameter is 
quite volatile throughout the sample period. Second, 
the matching efficiency has been drifting down since 
the start of the recession. Third, the value of filled 
jobs plummeted between 2007:12 and 2009:6 but has 
recovered quite significantly since then. Fourth, condi-
tional on the observed paths for the value of a job and 
all transition rates, the drop in matching efficiency since 
the start of the recession has had only a moderate im-168 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Effects on nonparticipation
(transitionary dynamics, N in matching function)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.















(transitionary dynamics, N in matching function)
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey.










Constant A, λs, ψ
Constant A, ψ
Constant ψ
pact on the unemployment rate. Fifth, the large effects 
on unemployment rate dynamics arise from changes 
in the transition rates. Sixth, the matching efficiency, 
the value of a job, the transition rates, and the search 
intensity of nonparticipants all have significant effects 
on the dynamics of nonparticipation. 
The analysis performed in this article decomposed 
the observed growth in unemployment and nonpartic-
ipation into contributions from changes in matching 
efficiency, the value of a job, the search intensity of 
nonparticipants, and the transition rates across different 
labor market states. This decomposition was done very 
much in the spirit of standard growth accounting ex-
ercises, in which GDP growth is decomposed into growth 
contributions from total factor productivity, capital, 
and labor. Interpreted as a growth accounting exercise, 
the results in this paper should be considered as extremely 
informative. However, care should be exercised in 
providing a counterfactual interpretation to the results. 
The reason is that if the matching efficiency had stayed 
constant at its 2007:12 level (instead of dropping as it 
actually did), this would have affected the value of a 
job and the transition rates across labor market states, 
but these secondary effects have not been considered 
in the analysis. That is, the contributions to labor market 
dynamics of the value of a job, the productivity of the 
matching function, the different transition rates, and 
the search intensity of nonparticipants have been cal-
culated as not affecting the other variables.10 To eval-
uate counterfactuals such as this, the explicit economic 
decisions and wage determination process that this paper 
has abstracted from would have to be incorporated and 
the equilibrium of such full-blown models would have 
to be analyzed. Of course, the counterfactual results 
would depend on how those modeling choices are made.
Another caveat to the analysis is that it has not 
incorporated job-to-job transitions. Since the workers 
making these transitions are competing for the same 
pool of vacancies as unemployed and nonparticipant 
workers, their behavior may affect the measurement 
of matching efficiency.169 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1The negative relation between unemployment and vacancies is not 
exclusive to the U.S.: It is present in a number of countries. See 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an empirical survey of the 
Beveridge curve and the matching function.
2Strictly speaking, what these papers implicitly assume is that the 
transitionary dynamics of the model economy are extremely fast. 
Under this assumption, they use the steady state of the model to 
analyze data, even when the matching function and transition rates 
change over short periods.
3The preferred specification is the one with the least restrictive and/
or most appealing assumptions. 
4We could choose alternative approaches. For instance, we could 
take the average of the ratios in equation 11 for every pair of months 
(i, j). The problem with this approach is that measurement errors 
would be severely amplified for pairs of months with similar unemploy-
ment/vacancy ratios. Another approach would be to take the average 
of the ratios in equation 11 for pairs of months with sufficiently large 
differences in unemployment/vacancy ratios. This approach would 
lead to a similar estimate for α as the approach chosen here.
5For Ut , I use the unemployment rate at month t from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS). For 
Vt , I use the average vacancies reported by the BLS’s Job 
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in months t and 
t−1, divided by the size of the labor force reported by the CPS in 
month t. I average the vacancies reported by JOLTS because they 
correspond to the number of vacancies at the end of the month, 
while the CPS data roughly correspond to observations in the mid-
dle of the month.
6This is a large number. However, Jt must be interpreted as the 
value of creating an additional job and not as the average value of 
all existing jobs. Obtaining such a large drop in the value of a mar-
ginal job should not be surprising, given the severity of the recession  
experienced by the U.S. at the time.
7See the conclusions for a further discussion of how to interpret 
the results of this article.
8See note 2 for a discussion of this estimation approach.
9These results should not be taken seriously. In what follows, I show 
that the large drop in matching efficiency obtained in figure 16 is 
an artifact of the constant transition rates.
10Observe that similar caution must be used in providing a counter-
factual interpretation to standard GDP growth accounting exercises. 
If total factor productivity had stayed constant during the last 50 years 
(instead of growing at its actual rate), this would have affected capital 
accumulation and labor supply. However, these secondary effects 
are not taken into account when reporting the contribution to growth 
of total factor productivity.
NOTES
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